הסדר הקבע: קמפ-דיוויד 2000, מתווה קלינטון וטאבה 2001
The Sharm el Sheikh Memorandum 1 On Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations The Government of the State of Israel ("GOI") and the Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO") commit themselves to full and mutual implementation of the Interim Agreement and all other agreements concluded between them since September 1993 (hereinafter "the prior agreements"), and all outstanding commitments emanating from the prior agreements. Without derogating from the other requirements of the prior agreements, the two Sides have agreed as follows: 1. Permanent Status negotiations: a. In the context of the implementation of the prior agreements, the two Sides will resume the Permanent Status negotiations in an accelerated manner and will make a determined effort to achieve their mutual goal of reaching a Permanent Status Agreement based on the agreed agenda i.e. the specific issues reserved for Permanent Status negotiators and other issues of common interest. b. The two Sides reaffirm their understanding that the negotiations on the Permanent Status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; c. The two Sides will make a determined effort to conclude a Framework Agreement on all Permanent Status issues in five months from the resumption of the Permanent Status negotiations; d. The two Sides will conclude a comprehensive agreement on all Permanent Status issues within one year from the resumption of the Permanent Status negotiations; e. Permanent Status negotiations will resume after the implementation of the first stage of release of prisoners and the second stage of the First and Second Further Redeployments and not later than September 13, 1999. In the Wye River Memorandum, the United States has expressed its willingness to facilitate these negotiations. 2. Phase One and Phase Two of the Further Redeployments The Israeli Side undertakes the following with regard to Phase One and Phase Two of the Further Redeployments: a. On September 5, 1999, to transfer 7% from Area C to Area B; 1 From: http://snipurl.com/27b1rfn 160
b. On November 15, 1999, to transfer 2% from Area B to Area A and 3% from Area C to Area B; c. On January 20, 2000, to transfer 1% from Area C to Area A, and 5.1% from Area B to Area A. 3. Release of Prisoners a. The two Sides shall establish a joint committee that shall follow-up on matters related to release of Palestinian prisoners. b. The Government of Israel shall release Palestinian and other prisoners who committed their offences prior to September 13, 1993, and were arrested prior to May 4, 1994. The Joint Committee shall agree on the names of those who will be released in the first two stages. Those lists shall be recommended to the relevant Authorities through the Monitoring and Steering Committee; c. The first stage of release of prisoners shall be carried out on September 5, 1999 and shall consist of 200 prisoners. The second stage of release of prisoners shall be carried out on October 8, 1999 and shall consist of 150 prisoners; d. The joint committee shall recommend further lists of names to be released to the relevant Authorities through the Monitoring and Steering Committee; e. The Israeli side will aim to release Palestinian prisoners before next Ramadan. 4. Committees a. The Third Further Redeployment Committee shall commence its activities not later than September 13, 1999; b. The Monitoring and Steering Committee, all Interim Committees (i.e. CAC, JEC, JSC, legal committee, people to people), as well as Wye River Memorandum committees shall resume and/or continue their activity, as the case may be, not later than September 13, 1999. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will have on its agenda, inter alia, the Year 2000, Donor/PA projects in Area C, and the issue of industrial estates; c. The Continuing Committee on displaced persons shall resume its activity on October 1, 1999 (Article XXVII, Interim Agreement); d. Not later than October 30, 1999, the two Sides will implement the recommendations of the Ad-hoc Economic Committee (article III-6, WRM). 161
5. Safe Passage a. The operation of the Southern Route of the Safe Passage for the movement of persons, vehicles, and goods will start on October 1, 1999 (Annex I, Article X, Interim Agreement) in accordance with the details of operation, which will be provided for in the Safe Passage Protocol that will be concluded by the two Sides not later than September 30, 1999; b. The two Sides will agree on the specific location of the crossing point of the Northern Route of the Safe Passage as specified in Annex I, Article X, provision c-4, in the Interim Agreement not later than October 5, 1999; c. The Safe Passage Protocol applied to the Southern Route of the Safe Passage shall apply to the Northern Route of the Safe Passage with relevant agreed modifications; d. Upon the agreement on the location of the crossing point of the Northern Route of the Safe Passage, construction of the needed facilities and related procedures shall commence and shall be ongoing. At the same time, temporary facilities will be established for the operation of the Northern Route not later than four months from the agreement on the specific location of the crossing-point; e. In between the operation of the Southern crossing point of the Safe Passage and the Northern crossing point of the Safe Passage, Israel will facilitate arrangements for the movement between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, using non-safe Passage routes other than the Southern Route of the Safe Passage; f. The location of the crossing points shall be without prejudice to the Permanent Status negotiations (Annex I, Article X, provision e, Interim Agreement). 6. Gaza Sea Port The two Sides have agreed on the following principles to facilitate and enable the construction works of the Gaza Sea Port. The principles shall not prejudice or preempt the outcome of negotiations on the Permanent Status: a. The Israeli Side agrees that the Palestinian Side shall commence construction works in and related to the Gaza Sea Port on October 1, 1999; b. The two Sides agree that the Gaza Sea Port will not be operated in any way before reaching a joint Sea Port protocol on all aspects of operating the Port, including security; c. The Gaza Sea Port is a special case, like the Gaza Airport, being situated in an area under the responsibility of the Palestinian Side and serving as an international passage. Therefore, with the conclusion of a joint Sea Port Protocol, all activities and arrangements relating to the construction of the Port shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Interim 162
Agreement, especially those relating to international passages, as adapted in the Gaza Airport Protocol; d. The construction shall ensure adequate provision for effective security and customs inspection of people and goods, as well as the establishment of a designated checking area in the Port; e. In this context, the Israeli side will facilitate on an on-going basis the works related to the construction of the Gaza Sea Port, including the movement in and out of the Port of vessels, equipment, resources, and material required for the construction of the Port; f. The two Sides will coordinate such works, including the designs and movement, through a joint mechanism. 7. Hebron Issues a. The Shuhada Road in Hebron shall be opened for the movement of Palestinian vehicles in two phases. The first phase has been carried out, and the second shall be carried out not later than October 30, 1999; b. The wholesale market-hasbahe will be opened not later than November 1, 1999, in accordance with arrangements which will be agreed upon by the two Sides; c. A high level Joint Liaison Committee will convene not later than September 13, 1999 to review the situation in the Tomb of the Patriarchs / Al Haram Al Ibrahimi (Annex I, Article VII, Interim Agreement and as per the January 15, 1998 US Minute of Discussion). 8. Security a. The two Sides will, in accordance with the prior agreements, act to ensure the immediate, efficient and effective handling of any incident involving a threat or act of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis. To this end, they will cooperate in the exchange of information and coordinate policies and activities. Each side shall immediately and effectively respond to the occurrence or anticipated occurrence of an act of terrorism, violence or incitement and shall take all necessary measures to prevent such an occurrence; b. Pursuant to the prior agreements, the Palestinian side undertakes to implement its responsibilities for security, security cooperation, on-going obligations and other issues emanating from the prior agreements, including, in particular, the following obligations emanating from the Wye River Memorandum: 1) continuation of the program for the collection of the illegal weapons, including reports; 2) apprehension of suspects, including reports; 3) forwarding of the list of Palestinian policemen to the Israeli Side not later than September 13, 1999; 163
4) beginning of the review of the list by the Monitoring and Steering Committee not later than October 15, 1999. 9. The two Sides call upon the international donor community to enhance its commitment and financial support to the Palestinian economic development and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 10. Recognizing the necessity to create a positive environment for the negotiations, neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in accordance with the Interim Agreement. 11. Obligations pertaining to dates, which occur on holidays or Saturdays, shall be carried out on the first subsequent working day. This memorandum will enter into force one week from the date of its signature. 2 Made and signed in Sharm el-sheikh, this fourth day of September 1999. 2 It is understood that, for technical reasons, implementation of Article 2-a and the first stage mentioned in Article 3-c will be carried out within a week from the signing of this Memorandum. 164
3 מפות קמפ-דיוויד 2000 ההצעה הישראלית הצעת ראש הממשלה אהוד ברק לפתרון בירושלים, יולי 2000 מתוך: http://snipurl.com/27azxql 3 165
Clinton Proposal on Israeli-Palestinian Peace 4 Territory Based on what the President heard, the President believes that a fair solution would be in the mid-90s i.e. 94-96% of the West Bank territory to the Palestinian State. The land annexed by Israel should be compensated by a land swap of 1-3%, in addition to the arrangements e.g. Permanent Safe Passage. The Parties should also consider the swap leased land to meet their respective needs. There are creative ways of doing this that could address Israeli or Palestinian issues or concerns. The President thought that the parties should develop a map consistent with the criteria: 1. 80% of settlers in Blocks of Settlements; 2. Contiguity; 3. Minimum annexation of territory to Israel; 4. Minimum number of Palestinian to be effected by the annexation. Security The President believes that the key lies in international presence that would only be withdrawn by minimal consent. This presence would also monitor the implementation of the agreement by both sides. It is the President's best judgment that the Israeli withdrawal should be phased over 36 months, while the international force is gradually introduced into the area. At the end of this period a small Israeli presence would remain in specified military locations in the Jordan Valley under the authority of the international force for another 36 months. This period could be reduced in the event of favorable regional developments that would diminish the threat to Israel. Early Warning Stations Israel should maintain three facilities in the West Bank with Palestinian liaison presence. The stations should be subject to review after 10 years, with any change in status to be mutually agreed. Emergency Deployment areas The President understood that the Parties still have to develop maps of relevant areas and routes. 4 from: http://www.peacelobby.org/clinton_parameters.htm 167
Emergency means the immanent and demonstrable threat to Israel's national security of a military nature that requires the activation of a national state emergency. The international force would need to be notified of any such determination. Airspace the State of Palestine would have sovereignty over the airspace but the two sides should work out special arrangements for Israeli training and operational needs. The President understood that the Israeli position that Palestine should be defined as "demilitarized" while the Palestinian side proposed a "State of Limited Arms". As compromise the President suggests "Non-militarized State". This would be consistent with the fact that in addition to a strong Palestinian security force, Palestine will have an international force for border security and deterrence purposes. Jerusalem and Refugees General The President's sense was that remaining gaps would have more to do with formulation then with practical reality. Jerusalem What is Arab should be Palestinian and what is Jewish should be Israeli. This would apply to the Old City as well. The President urges the Parties to work on maps that would ensure maximum contiguity to for both sides. The President knows that the Parties discussed different formulations. He wanted to suggest two additional ones to formulize the Palestinian de-facto control over the Harem, while respecting the convictions of the Jewish people. With regard to either one, international monitoring to provide for mutual confidence: 1. Palestinian sovereignty over the Harem, and Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall (a) and the space sacred to Jews of which is a part of; or (b) the holy of holiest of which is a part. 2. Palestinian sovereignty over the Harem and Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall + shared functional sovereignty over the issue of excavation under the Harem or behind the Wall. That way mutual consent would be required before any excavation took place. Refugees The President believes that the differences are with formulation the solutions rather than with what would happen on the practical level. 168
Israel is prepared to acknowledge the moral and material suffering caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the 1948 War and the need to assist in the international community's effort in addressing the problem. International commission to implement all aspects of that flow from the agreement: compensation, resettlement, rehabilitation, etc. The US is prepared to lead an international effort to help the refugees. The fundamental gap: how to handle the Right of Return (ROR). The President knows the history of the issue and how hard is it for the Palestinian leadership to appear to be abandoning this principle. At the same time, the Israeli side could not accept and reference to the ROR that would imply a right to immigrate to Israel in defiance of Israel's sovereign policy on admission or that would threaten the Jewish character of the state. Any solution must address both needs and be consistent with the two-state approach that both sides should have accepted as a way to end the Israel-Palestinian conflict: The State of Palestine as the homeland for the Palestinian people and the State of Israel as the homeland for the Jewish people. In a two-state solution, the State of Palestine will be the focal point for Palestinians who choose to return to the area, without ruling out that Israel would accept some of these refugees. The President believes that the Parties need to adopt a formulation on the ROR that will make clear that there is no specific ROR to Israel itself, but that does not negate the aspirations of the Palestinian people to return to the area. In light of that, the President suggests the following to alternatives: 1. Both sides recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to return to historic Palestine; 2. Both sides recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland. The agreement would define the implementation of this general right in a way that is consistent with the two-state solution. It will list the 5 possible final homes for the refugees: 1. The State of Palestine; 2. Areas of Israel being transferred to Palestine in the land swap; 3. Rehabilitation in the host countries; 4. Resettlement in third countries and 5. Admission to Israel. In listing these options the agreement would make clear that return to the West Bank and Gaza or the areas acquired through the land swap would be a right for all Palestinian refugees while rehabilitation in host countries, resettlement in 3 rd countries or absorption to Israel would depend upon the policies of these countries. 169
Israel could indicate in the agreement that it intended to establish a policy so that some of the refugees to be absorbed into Israel consistent with Israel's sovereign decision. The President believes priority should be given to the refugees in Lebanon. The Parties would agree that is implements UNGAR 194. End of Conflict and Finality of Claims The President proposed that the agreement clearly marked the End of the Conflict and its implementation put an end to all claims. This could be manifested through a UNSCR that notes that UNSCRs 242 and 338 have been implemented and through the release of Palestinian prisoners. The President believes that this is the outline for a fair and lasting agreement. It gives the Palestinian people the ability to determine their future in their own land, a sovereign and viable state recognized by the international community; El-Quds as its capital, sovereignty over the Harem and new lives to the refugees. It gives to the People of Israel a genuine End of Conflict, real security, the preservation of sacred religious ties, the incorporation of 80% of the settler into Israel and the largest Jerusalem in history recognized by all as your capital. Final comments This is the best that the President can do. Brief the leaders and let the President know if they are prepared to come to discussion based on these ideas. If not, the President has taken it as far as he can. These are the ideas of the President. If they are not accepted, they are not just off the table; they go with the President as he leaves office. 170
Mr. Samuel Berger National Security Advisor The White House January 5, 2001 Response of the Government of Israel to the ideas raised by President Clinton regarding the outline of a Framework Agreement on Permanent Status Dear Mr. Berger, Further to the recent conversation between the President and the Prime Minister, and on behalf of the Prime Minister, I wish to convey to you our comments with regard to the President ideas. The decision of the Ministerial Committee on National Security of Government of Israel of December 28, 2000 is as follows: "President Clinton's ides contribute to the renewal of intensive negotiation towards a permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. We consider these ideas to be a basis for discussion, provided that they remain, as they are, a basis for discussion acceptable to the Palestinians. Israel will request a number of clarifications concerning matters of vital interest to Israel. Israel expresses its gratitude to President Clinton for his crucial contribution, now and throughout his entire tenure, to advancing the peace process in the Middle East toward a better future for the peoples of the region." I wish to note that some of the elements outlined by the President differ from the Israeli positions as presented in the final stages of the negotiation, and, on other issues, the President ideas run contrary to ours. I refer, among others, to the following: Israel's objective, recognized by the President, is to incorporate 80% of the Settlement within the Settlement Blocks under Israeli sovereignty. However, the numerical territorial values indicated by the President to become under Israeli sovereignty are insufficient in themselves to achieve this goal, as well as to address the additional "criteria for the development of the map" as mention by the President. The President's ideas regarding both the Old City and Har Habayit are different for Israel's, which stress the concept of overriding Special Regime for entire Holy Basin. In addition, the suggested sovereign and functional arrangements in and around Har Habayit require further elaboration to take adequate account of the 3000-years ties of Judaism to the site. Finally, the creation on sustainable arrangements in all relevant spheres, e.g. civil affairs, security, 171
religion and municipal services, for all the inhabitants of Yerushalaim and El-Quds would require balancing of the various principles outlined by the President. The President's ideas of security-related issue differ from the Israeli one with regard to the Palestinian police and security forces, the mandate of the international/ multinational presence/ force and the monitoring of non-militarization of Palestine, the aerial arrangement, the suggest timeline and the related conditions in other areas of security and military significance. On the issues of refugees, the formulas concerning the Right of Return of the refugees embody certain ambiguity, which Israel wishes to avoid. Some of the ideas mentioned by the President require further clarification in the course of future negotiations (see attached annex). Addressing these points, and others, should not call into question the internal logic of the President's ideas. In addition, other topics of great significance for the Permanent relations between the Parties have thus far not been addressed. These topics should be discussed in the course of future negotiations, as well. The President's ideas are a courageous attempt to offer the parties the principles and guidelines for a Framework Agreement on Permanent Status. Conclusion of an agreement on this basis would entail historic concessions by Israel, as well as by the Palestinians. Under any such agreement, Israel would be force to confront a tremendously difficult rupture, or ruptures, among its citizens, with the hope to genuinely having ended the conflict with the Palestinian people. Further to the recent discussion in Washington, a substantial reduction in violence and terror could allow the resumption of the dialogue on the framework of the permanent relations between Israel and the Palestinians. On behalf of the Prime Minister and myself, I wish you a happy and peaceful New Year. Sincerely yours, Gilead Sher Chief of Bureau of the Prime Minister 172
Annex Points of Clarification 1. General Issues - Israel understands that the Finality of Claims would be established upon agreement on the terms of the FAPS. Israel understands Finality of Claims means the following: (a) The FAPS identifies all the claims of the Parties emanating from the conflict and arising from the events occurring prior to its signature. (b) No further such claims may be raised by either Party in the future. Any claim arising from the past relations between the Palestinian People and Israel will be raised only in as much as they are recognized within the FAPS. (c) Save as agreed, the settlement of these claims will be achieved through the implementation of the FAPS. - Israel understands that the FAPS shall stand serve as the only agreed basis for the implementation of the UNSCRs 242 and 338, as well as for the resolution of all other outstanding issues emanating from the conflict. - Israel understands that the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination will have been exercised upon the establishment of a Palestinian State within its agreed international borders. - Israel understands that issues that were agreed upon in the course of the negotiations remain on the table, even if they are not mentioned by the President's ideas. - Israel understands that there will be Palestinian within the Settlement Blocks that will be annexed to Israel. These Palestinian shall not be subjected to special regimes. - Israel understands that the Safe Passage would be under Israeli sovereignty. - Israel understands that special arrangements for the benefit of Palestine within, through or over Israeli sovereign territory would be taken into account in the context of territorial "compensation". - Israel takes it as a starting point that the core logic underlying the President's ideas consists of respect for the beliefs of members of all faiths and establishment of effective arrangements which guarantee freedom of access and worship. This core logic will applied to the Tomb of the Patriarchs, Rachel's Tomb, Joseph's Tomb and other agreed holy sites. 173
2. Jerusalem - Israel understands that, in maintaining contiguity, the principle of "Arab to Palestine and Jewish to Israel" shall be applied to neighborhoods. - Israel understands that the fundamental principle underlying the President's ideas concerning the compound of Temple Mount is that what is holy to Islam shall be under Palestinian sovereignty and what is holy to Judaism shall be under Israeli sovereignty. Accordingly, " Western Wall and the (a) space sacred to Jews of which is a part; or (b) holiest of the holy of which is a part " should be understood to incorporate the Kotel Tunnel, the Mahkame building, the Kotel itself and the remaining part of the Wall towards the South Wall, as well as Ofel Garden, the City of David, Mt. of Olives, and the Tombs of the Kings and Prophets. 3. Security - Israel understands that unless explicitly otherwise expressed by the President, the Camp David summit understandings as summarized by the President in Camp David remain a valid basis for the permanent agreement. - Israel understands that the powers and functions of the Palestinian police/ security force shall remain solely as agreed in the past: maintaining law and order, fighting against terrorism, and preserving internal security. - Israel assumes that the concept of a "non-militarized state" mandated, inter alia, that (a) Palestine would not be allowed to maintain any other armed force except its official security force; (b) No other armed forces, with the exception of the agreed upon Israeli and multinational force, could be stationed or deployed in, or passed through or over Palestinian territories. - Israel understands that the Israeli forces in the specified military locations shall be under exclusive Israeli jurisdiction and shall not be under the command of the multinational force. - Israel understands that the multinational (international) presence/ force will be US-led. Israel further understands that the roll of the multinational (international) force (the force) in monitoring and verifying the implementation of the agreement shall focus on: (a) Guaranteeing the non-militarization of Palestine through deployment along its aerial, land and,maritime perimeter including at all entry points; (b) Securing the designated locations for emergency deployment of Israeli forces. - Israel understands that the arrangements providing for its operational needs in the Palestinian airspace shall be based on Israeli control thereof. Israel further understands that similar arrangements shall apply the electromagnetic spectrum of Palestine. 174
4. Refugees - Israel understands that any entry of refugees to Israel shall be a matter of sole sovereign Israeli discretion on the basis of Israeli considerations such as humanitarian needs. - Israel assumes that the issue of Jewish refugees would also be addressed. - Israel understands that the President's ideas imply the acceptance of the concept of a Lump- Sum Agreement with an agreed finite Israeli contribution thereof. 175
Official Palestinian Response to The Clinton Parameters (and letter to the international community) 5 January 1, 2001 Remarks and Questions from the Palestinian Negotiating Team Regarding the United States Proposal Palestinian and Israeli negotiators met last week in Washington, D.C. as part of our continuing effort to achieve a comprehensive peace agreement. At the conclusion of the week, President Clinton offered a number of proposals intended to define the parameters for an immediate settlement. We remain grateful for the United States considerable contributions to peace efforts and welcome its continuing involvement in future negotiations. We are particularly indebted to President Clinton for the tremendous effort he has expended in promoting a just and lasting peace between Palestinians and Israelis. It is to his credit that both sides have come so far over the last seven years. As President Clinton has stated on so many occasions, however, the only successful and permanent peace will be one that takes into account the concerns of all parties and that is acceptable to Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims, as well as to Israel, within the agreed upon bases for the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, namely UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. We wish to explain why the latest United States proposals, taken together and as presented without clarification, fail to satisfy the conditions required for a permanent peace. As it stands now, the United States proposal would: 1. Divide a Palestinian state into three separate cantons connected and divided by Jewish-only and Arab-only roads and jeopardize the a Palestinian state s viability; 2. Divide Palestinian Jerusalem into a number of unconnected islands separate from each other and from the rest of Palestine; 3. Force Palestinians to surrender the right of return of Palestinian refugees. It also fails to provide workable security arrangements between Palestine and Israel, and to address a number of other issues of importance to the Palestinian people. The United States proposal seems to respond to Israeli demands while neglecting the basic Palestinian need: a viable state. The United States proposals were couched in general terms that in some instances lack clarity and detail. A permanent status agreement, in our view, is not merely a document that declares general political principles. It is, rather, a comprehensive instrument that spells out the details, modalities, and timetables of ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. For such an agreement to be effective, it must be backed by clear, effective international implementation guarantees. We believe that a 5 from: http://www.intertech.ps/nad/print.php?id=98 177
general, vague agreement at this advanced stage of the peace process will be counter-productive. This conviction has resulted from our past experiences with vague agreements and from Israel s history of non-compliance with signed agreements. The permanent status agreement must be a truly final agreement rather than an agreement to negotiate. The United States side presented proposals regarding four primary issues: territory, Jerusalem, refugees, and security. Territory of the Palestinian State On the issue of territory, the United States proposed that Israel annex 4 to 6 percent of the West Bank; that the annexation be compensated through a land swap of 1 to 3 percent; and that the Parties also consider a swap of leased land. The United States recommended that the final map be drawn in a manner that would place 80 percent of Israeli settlers in annexed settlement blocs, but that would nevertheless promote territorial contiguity, minimize annexed areas and minimize the number of Palestinians affected. This proposal poses a number of serious problems. As the proposal is not accompanied by a map, and because the total area from which the percentages are calculated is not defined, it is difficult to imagine how the percentages presented can be reconciled with the goal of Palestinian contiguity. This is especially worrisome in light of the fact that the Israeli side continues to insist, and the United States has never questioned, that Jerusalem, as defined by Israel, the no-man s land, and the Dead Sea are not part of the total area from which the percentages are calculated. Moreover, the United States proposal calls for the swap of leased land. It is not entirely clear if Palestinian interests are served by such a swap since the Palestinian side has no territorial needs in Israel, except for a corridor linking the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which will be covered in a land swap. This proposal, taken together with the map presented by the Israeli side in the most recent round of negotiations in Washington (see attached map), provides Israel with control over large swaths of land, rendering the Palestinian state unviable and lacking direct access to international borders. Without a map clarifying the above ambiguities, the United States proposal does nothing to foreclose a return by Israel to its proposals at Camp David which leaves 10% of the West Bank under Israeli sovereignty and an additional 10% under Israeli control pursuant to ill-defined security arrangements. It is important to bear in mind that all of the settlements in the West Bank currently occupy approximately 2 percent of the West Bank. In this context, the Palestinian side rejects the use of settlement blocs as a guiding principle as recommended by the United States proposal. The use of this criterion subordinates Palestinian interests in the contiguity of their state and control over their natural resources to Israeli interests regarding the contiguity of settlements, recognized as illegal by the international community. It also contradicts the United States proposal s criteria concerning minimizing annexed areas and the number of Palestinians affected. In addition, the Palestinian side needs to know exactly which settlements Israel intends to annex. Ultimately, it is impossible to agree to a proposal that punishes Palestinians while rewarding Israel s illegal settlement policies. A proposal involving annexation of 4 to 6 percent (not to mention 10 178
percent) of the land would inevitably damage vital Palestinian interests. Under such a proposal, a number of Palestinian villages will be annexed to Israel, adding to the already great number of displaced Palestinians. Moreover, as the attached map demonstrates, a large quantity of unsettled land in key development areas such as Jerusalem and Bethlehem will also be annexed by Israel, destroying the territorial contiguity of the State of Palestine. In addition to compromising Palestinians freedom of movement within their own state, this would also have serious ramifications for the state s development potential. In addition, any such large-scale annexation will inevitably prejudice Palestinian water rights. As for the land swap, the United States proposal does not identify which areas within Israel are to compensate for the annexed land. The Palestinian side continues to insist that any annexed land must be compensated with land of equal size and value. No argument has been presented as to why this should not be the case. However, the United States proposal explicitly rejects the principle that compensation of land must be of equal size and remains silent on the issue of the location and quality of the compensated land. All previous Israeli and United States proposals concerning compensated land have referred to land near the Gaza Strip in exchange for valuable real estate in the West Bank. In addition to being desert areas, the lands being offered near the Gaza Strip are currently being used by Israel to dump toxic waste. Obviously, we cannot accept trading prime agricultural and development land for toxic waste dumps. Jerusalem On the issue of Jerusalem, President Clinton articulated a general principle that Arab areas are Palestinian and Jewish areas are Israeli, but urged the two sides to work on maps to create maximum contiguity for both. Two alternative formulations were presented addressing each State s sovereignty over and rights to the Haram al-sharif ( Haram ) and the Western Wall ( Wall ). Both formulations provide for Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram and Israeli sovereignty over the Wall, restricting the Parties from excavating beneath the Haram or behind the Wall. The United States formulations on the Haram are problematic. First, the proposal appears to recognize Israeli sovereignty under the Haram by implying that it has a right, which it voluntarily relinquishes, to excavate behind the Western Wall (i.e., the area under the Haram.) Moreover, the Western Wall extends to areas beyond the Wailing Wall, including the tunnel opened in 1996 by Israel s former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu which caused widespread confrontations. The territorial aspects of the United States proposals concerning Jerusalem also raise very serious concerns and call for further clarification. As the attached map shows, as a result of Israel s internationally-condemned settlement policy in occupied East Jerusalem, the United States formulation that Arab areas are Palestinian and Jewish ones are Israeli will be impossible to reconcile with the concept of maximum contiguity for both, presented in the proposal. Rather, the formulation will inevitably result in Palestinian islands within the city separated from one another. Israel, however, will be able to maintain contiguity. Therefore, the proposal is actually calling for maximum contiguity for both translates in practice into maximum contiguity for Israel. 179
Israel s continued demand for sovereignty over a number of geographically undefined religious sites in Jerusalem, and its refusal to present maps clearly showing its territorial demands in Jerusalem only compounds the Palestinian concerns. Any formulation that will be acceptable by the Palestinian side must guarantee the contiguity of Palestinian areas within the city as well as the contiguity of Jerusalem with the rest of Palestine. A key element of the Palestinian position on Jerusalem is its status as an Open City with free access for all. This status is imperative not only to ensure access to and worship in all holy sites for all those who hold the city sacred, but also to guarantee free movement through the State of Palestine. Unfortunately, the United States proposal makes no reference to this essential concept. Palestinian Refugees On the issue of Palestinian refugees, driven from their homes as a result of the establishment of the state of Israel, the United States proposed that both sides recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to return either to historic Palestine or to their homeland, but added that the agreement should make clear that there is no specific right of return to what is now Israel. Instead, it proposed five possible final homes for the refugees: 1. The State of Palestine. 2. Areas in Israel transferred to Palestine in the "land swap". 3. Rehabilitation in the host countries. 4. Resettlement in third countries. 5. Admission to Israel. All refugees would have the right to return to the State of Palestine; however, rehabilitation in host countries, resettlement in third countries, and admission to Israel all would depend on the policies of those individual countries. The United States proposal reflects a wholesale adoption of the Israeli position that the implementation of the right of return be subject entirely to Israel s discretion. It is important to recall that Resolution 194, long regarded as the basis for a just settlement of the refugee problem, calls for the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes, wherever located not to their homeland or to historic Palestine. The essence of the right of return is choice: Palestinians should be given the option to choose where they wish to settle, including return to the homes from which they were driven. There is no historical precedent for a people abandoning their fundamental right to return to their homes whether they were forced to leave or fled in fear. We will not be the first people to do so. Recognition of the right of return and the provision of choice to refugees is a pre-requisite for the closure of the conflict. The Palestinians are prepared to think flexibly and creatively about the mechanisms for implementing the right of return. In many discussions with Israel, mechanisms for implementing this right in such a way so as to end the refugee status and refugee problem, as well as to otherwise accommodate Israeli concerns, have been identified and elaborated in some detail. The United 180
States proposal fails to make reference to any of these advances and refers back to earlier Israeli negotiating positions. In addition, the United States proposal fails to provide any assurance that refugee rights to restitution and compensation will be fulfilled. Security On the issue of security, the United States proposed that there be an international presence to guarantee the implementation of the agreement. The United States proposal suggests that the Israeli withdrawal should be carried out over a 3 year period, with international forces phased in on a gradual basis. Then, at the end of this period, an Israeli military presence would be allowed to remain in the Jordan Valley for another three years under the authority of the international force. The United States also proposed that Israel be permitted to maintain three early warning stations for at least ten years and that it be given the right to deploy its forces in Palestinian territory during a national state of emergency. In addition, the United States has suggested that Palestine be defined as a non-militarized State, and, while acknowledging Palestinian sovereignty over its own airspace, it has proposed that the two sides develop special arrangements for Israeli training and operational needs. Although the United States proposals place less burdens on Palestinian sovereignty than earlier Israeli proposals, they nevertheless raise a number of concerns. There is no reason why Israel would require three years to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In view of the fact that Israel resettled more than one million immigrants from the former Soviet Union in a few years, one year is more than enough time to resettle less than 60,000 Israeli settlers. It is moreover unclear from the United States proposal that the withdrawal period relates to both soldiers and settlers, both of whom are considered part of the occupation forces in the Palestinian Territories. A protracted withdrawal process could jeopardize the peaceful implementation of the agreement and would create a continued source of friction. There are other Palestinian concerns. Israel has yet to make a persuasive case regarding why it would require either a standing force in the Jordan Valley or emergency deployment rights much less both. This is especially the case given that international forces will be present in these areas. Furthermore, Israel requires no more than one early warning station in the West Bank to satisfy its strategic needs. The maintenance of stations at current locations near Ramallah and Nablus and in East Jerusalem will seriously inhibit Palestinian development. Moreover, the United States proposal would give Israel sole discretion for determining how long these stations will be operational. The United States proposal s suggestion that special arrangements be made for Israeli training and operational needs in Palestinian airspace is also extremely problematic. Without specific clarification, this might be used to defend a right for Israel to use Palestinian airspace for military training exercises with all the accompanying dangers to the Palestinian civilian population and the environment while sparing Israeli citizens from any similar infringement. Palestinians remain committed to working out regional agreements concerning aviation in line with commonly accepted 181
international regulations. Any arrangement to the contrary would infringe on Palestinian sovereignty and harm relations with neighboring countries. Other Issues The United States proposal remains silent on a number of issues that are essential for the establishment of a lasting and comprehensive peace. By focusing solely on the four issues above, the United States proposal not only neglects matters relating to ending the conflict, but also disregards ways to ensure that the future relations between the two peoples will be mutually beneficial. Specifically, the proposal does not address water, compensation for damages resulting from over thirty years of occupation, the environment, future economic relations, and other state-to-state issues. End of Conflict While we are totally committed to ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, we believe that this can only be achieved once the issues that have caused and perpetrated the conflict are resolved in full. This in turn can only be achieved by a comprehensive agreement that provides detailed modalities for the resolution of the issues at the core of the conflict. It must be remembered that in reaching a settlement between Israel and, respectively, Egypt and Jordan, the end of conflict came only after the final, detailed peace treaty. Even putting aside the requirements of international law and justice, the United States proposals - unless clarified to take into account the above concerns - do not even allow for a pragmatic resolution of the conflict. If no such solutions are reached in practice, we believe that any formalistic pronouncement of the end of conflict would be meaningless. Conclusion We would like, once again, to emphasize that we remain committed to a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and international law. In view of the tremendous human cost caused by each delay in negotiations, we recognize the need to resolve this conflict as soon as possible. We cannot, however, accept a proposal that secures neither the establishment of a viable Palestinian state nor the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes. 182
Dear Madam/Sir, Please find attached a memorandum elaborating some of the remarks and questions of the Palestinian Negotiating Teams regarding the proposal made by the United States in the most recent round of negotiations in Washington, D.C. I would like to assure you that we remain committed to reaching a permanent status agreement with Israel, so as to reach a lasting and comprehensive peace. We also are grateful for all the suggestions and proposals made by the international community aimed at facilitating the conclusion of such an agreement. However, we believe that for such an agreement to be able to achieve its goal of a just and lasting peace, it must be truly comprehensive and clear, avoiding any future misunderstandings that may, in themselves, jeopardize peace and stability in the region. In short, we want to avoid a repetition of the flaws contained in the previous agreement between the Palestinians and Israel. We believe that such flaws would have a far more devastating effect in the context of a permanent status agreement. It is with this spirit that the following remarks and requests for clarification regarding the United States proposal are made. We need to be sure that both sides agree to the same contents from the outset so as to preclude future stalemates and deadlocks in a process that will determine permanent relations between the Palestinian people and Israel. I hope that the following remarks will be useful in clarifying the Palestinian position regarding the United States proposal, and that they will contribute to reaching a stable, comprehensive, and permanent peace in the region. Yours truly, Yasser Abed Rabbo Head of the Palestinian Negotiating Team 183
Israeli-Palestinian Joint Statement 6 27 January 2001 The following is the official text of the joint statement released yesterday by Israeli and Palestinian negotiators as published in the Jerusalem Post (Jan 28, 2001): The Israeli and Palestinian delegations conducted during the last six days serious, deep and practical talks with the aim of reaching a permanent and stable agreement between the two parties. The Taba talks were unprecedented in their positive atmosphere and expression of mutual willingness to meet the national, security and existential needs of each side. Given the circumstances and time constraints, it proved impossible to reach understandings on all issues, despite the substantial progress that was achieved in each of the issues discussed. The sides declare that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resumption of negotiations following the Israeli elections. The two sides take upon themselves to return to normalcy and to establish [a] security situation on the ground through the observation of their mutual commitments in the spirit of the Sharm e-sheikh memorandum. The negotiation teams discussed four main themes: refugees, security, borders and Jerusalem, with a goal to reach a permanent agreement that will bring an end to the conflict between them and provide peace to both people. The two sides took into account the ideas suggested by President Clinton together with their respective qualifications and reservations. On all these issues there was substantial progress in the understanding of the other side's positions and in some of them the two sides grew closer. As stated above, the political timetable prevented reaching an agreement on all the issues. However, in light of the significant progress in narrowing the differences between the sides, the two sides are convinced that in a short period of time and given an intensive effort and the acknowledgment of the essential and urgent nature of reaching an agreement, it will be possible to bridge the differences remaining and attain a permanent settlement of peace between them. In this respect, the two sides are confident that they can begin and move forward in this process at the earliest practical opportunity. 6 from: http://snipurl.com/27b1xlu 185
The Taba talks conclude an extensive phase in the Israeli-Palestinian permanent status negotiations with a sense of having succeeded in rebuilding trust between the sides and with the notion that they were never closer in reaching an agreement between them than today. We leave Taba in a spirit of hope and mutual achievement, acknowledging that the foundations have been laid both in reestablishing mutual confidence and in having progressed in a substantive engagement on all core issues. The two sides express their gratitude to President Hosni Mubarak for hosting and facilitating these talks. They also express their thanks to the European Union for its role in supporting the talks. 186
7 מפות פסגת טאבה 2001 מפת ההצעה הישראלית סיפוח בהיקף של 8% מפת ההצעה הישראלית סיפוח בהיקף של 6% מתוך: http://snipurl.com/27azxql 7 187